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What’s in the Forecast for the SPAC Boom & the PSLRA?
Nick Krone*
In July 2021, Trevor Milton was freed from prison on a $100 million bond.1
Milton is the founder, former CEO and executive chairman of Nikola
Corporation, an electric vehicle startup.2 He had just pleaded not guilty to
two counts of securities fraud and one count of wire fraud after being
indicted by a federal grand jury.3 The fraud counts alleged Milton lied
about “nearly all aspects of the business” to bolster stock sales of the
electric vehicle startup.4 It is alleged Milton “brazenly and repeatedly used
social media, and appearances and interviews on television, podcasts, and
in print, to make false and misleading claims about the status of Nikola’s
trucks and technology.”5
In December 2021, just 18 months after its shares debuted on the
NASDAQ, Nikola agreed to pay $125 million to settle charges brought by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), separate from the
criminal fraud charges brought against Milton.6 Similar to the criminal
suit against Milton, the SEC suit claimed Milton embarked on a public
relations campaign aimed at inflating and maintaining Nikola’s stock
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price, all before it had produced a single commercial product.7 More
specifically, the SEC’s order found that Milton “misled investors about
Nikola’s technological advancements, in-house production capabilities,
hydrogen production, truck reservation orders, and financial outlook.”8
The order went on to find Nikola “further misled investors by
misrepresenting or omitting material facts about the refueling time of its
prototype vehicles, the status of its headquarters’ hydrogen station, the
anticipated cost and sources of electricity for its planned hydrogen
production, and the economic risks and benefits associated with its
contemplated partnership with a leading auto manufacturer.”9
Why was Milton allowed to embark on this public relations campaign
with lofty projections to inflate Nikola’s stock before it went public? After
all, in the run-up to an initial public offering, startups typically hunker
down in a quiet period, keeping their executives out of the media to avoid
running afoul of regulatory requirements.10 These regulatory requirements
are imposed by the SEC to prevent companies from marketing their stock
to unsophisticated investors outside of the normal regimented process.11
Milton was allowed to make these projections and vigorously promote
Nikola stock because Nikola was going public via a special purpose
acquisition company (SPAC) versus a traditional IPO.12
A SPAC is a shell company that has no commercial operations and is
formed strictly to raise capital through an IPO for the purpose of
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acquiring or merging with an existing company.13 SPACs are commonly
referred to as blank check companies because they do not have an
established business plan.14 A SPAC conducts an IPO to raise capital from
a mix of institutional and retail investors.15 Typically, 100% of the cash
raised in the IPO is placed in a trust account and not released until the
SPAC completes a business combination or upon a specified outside date
if the SPAC fails to complete a business combination by such time.16 A
SPAC generally has two years to complete a deal or face liquidation.17 In
order to compensate investors for agreeing to have their capital held in the
trust account for such period, a SPAC generally offers units in its IPO,
each comprised of one share of common stock and a warrant to purchase
common stock.18 A warrant is a right, but not an obligation, to acquire
securities from the issuer at a set price during a specified period.19 The
warrant portion of the unit is intended to provide investors with this extra
compensation.20
A key difference between SPACs and traditional IPOs concerns
differences in disclosure-based liability exposure.21 One prominent
difference that has garnered significant attention concerns the
applicability of the safe harbor for forward-looking statements contained
in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).22 The
PSLRA is a provision that makes it harder for investors to win a lawsuit
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alleging that forward-looking statements were misleading.23 A SPAC is
protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision when it shares its target’s
growth projections with investors, a traditional IPO is not.24 This allows
for regulatory arbitrage, which is the practice whereby firms capitalize on
loopholes in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavorable
regulations.25 Lawmakers and the SEC have recently called for reform that
would remove SPACs from the protection of the PSLRA’s safe harbor and
force them to follow the same rules traditional IPOs must conform to as it
relates to forward-looking statements.26
But are these proposed regulations that would strip SPACs of the PSLRA’s
safe harbor necessary? If forward-looking statements were eliminated to
shield unreasonable investors, it would come at the expense of reasonable
investors.27 Reasonable investors want forward-looking information to
make informed investment decisions.28 An issue regulators are trying to
address is retail investors have on average paid inflated prices for SPAC
shares after the announcement of a business combination.29 But is this a
result of overreliance on forward-looking statements or is it lack of
comprehension regarding other elements of a typical SPAC? Traditional
IPO issuers do not provide any forecasts to the market, and yet there are
still large runups in IPO share prices when aftermarket trading
commences.30 If unreasonable investors trading in inefficient markets
misvalue stocks when exposed to management forecasts, they will also
misvalue stocks for a myriad of other reasons, including lack of financial
acumen.31
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With so many unknowns as to the motivations of unreasonable investors,
it is not clear that eliminating safe harbor protections of SPACs will have
the intended effects regulators are currently setting out to effectuate.
Therefore, Congress and the SEC should first explore these motivations
before passing legislation or rules addressing SPACs and the PSLRA. But
regulators must act swiftly in this effort because as the SPAC boom
continues, it is only a matter of time before the next Nikola emerges.
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